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OLYMPIODORUS ON PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION: 
AN UNDOGMATIC APPROACH?
Abstract. Umsu-Seifert, Cagla, Olympiodorus on Philosophical Education: An Undogmatic Approach? 
(Olymipodorus na temat edukacji filozoficznej: podejście niedogmatyczne?).
Plato and the Platonists presented different positions on philosophical education. This paper explores the views 
of Olympiodorus, a 6th-century AD Platonist, on education and the role of a teacher. Olympiodorus’ approach 
to the conception of philosophical authority provides a new perspective for re-evaluating the significance of 
his philosophy. 
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In his review of Olympiodorus’ Commentary on the Alcibiades,1 Dodds 
states that the text offers “almost nothing that appears to be original.”2 This 
view is also shared by Westerink, who concludes that in Olympiodorus’ case 
“it might be more correct to speak of a teaching routine than of a philosophy.”3 
By contrast, many studies and translations have appeared in recent decades 
regarding Olympiodorus as an acknowledged philosopher of late antiquity.4 
However, since he is considered a follower of Proclus and Damascius, few 
1 I am grateful to Monika Miazek-Męczyńska, the anonymous peer reviewers, and the editors 
of Symbolae Philologorum Posnaniensium for their valuable suggestions.
2 Dodds 1957: 356. This review referred to the 1956 edition of Westerink, Olympiodorus’ 
Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato. 
3 Westerink 1976: 23.
4 A significant contribution to the research on Olympiodorus’ philosophical approach has been 
made by Tarrant 1997, 2007 and 2021. Griffin (2014: 3) argues that although Olympiodorus draws 
on previous philosophers, his choices and the ways in which he presents their arguments consti-
tute his own philosophy. According to Griffin (2016: 2), Olympiodorus’ contribution lies in his 
attempts to reconcile the views of Proclus and Damascius. Several other scholars, such as Gertz 
(2011: 9), consider Olympiodorus’ interpretation a simplification of Proclus’ theory.
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interpret his approach as original.5 The significance of Olympiodorus' 
philosophy thus remains disputed.
A central aspect of this debate concerns the possibility of an individual or 
original approach under the authority of Plato and the Platonist tradition.6 The 
influence of a teacher in later Platonism has been examined by Tarrant (2000), 
though his thesis is centred on Olympiodorus’ views on Plato’s Gorgias. Other 
studies emphasise the nature of Olympiodorus’ philosophy as a teaching concept 
and his interpretation of Alcibiades and Plato in this context.7 However, there 
is still a need to connect his description of education with the question of his 
philosophy’s originality.
The present paper aims to serve this purpose by outlining Olympiodorus’ 
understanding of Socrates’ philosophical investigation and Plato’s teaching. 
In his commentary on the Alcibiades, Olympiodorus examines the characters 
of the dialogue, as well as Plato’s life, in detail. This commentary highlights 
Olympiodorus’ differences with the previous Platonists, since a direct 
comparison with Proclus’ interpretation of the same dialogue is possible.8 
A fundamental challenge in these commentaries was to explain the reason 
for Socrates’ conversation with Alcibiades.9 Considering Alcibiades’ later 
political career, his dialogue with Socrates on self-knowledge was regarded 
as problematic. Olympiodorus solves this issue by describing Alcibiades’ 
positive character traits, as well as by emphasising the role of a teacher as 
a mutual investigator.
5 Griffin (2014: 3) argues that although Olympiodorus draws on previous philosophers, his 
choices and the ways in which he presents their arguments constitute his own philosophy. Accord-
ing to Griffin (2016: 2), Olympiodorus’ contribution lies in his attempts to reconcile the views of 
Proclus and Damascius. Several other scholars, such as Gertz (2011: 9), consider Olympiodorus’ 
interpretation a simplification of Proclus’ theory.
6 Recent research shows the relevance of the paradigm of authority in Platonism. Sedley 2021 
points to the invention of a dogmatic authority after Plato’s death, while in the Early Academy 
a diverse group of intellectuals came together around a concept of Socratic inquiry rather than 
a transmission of doctrines. See also Petrucci 2021 and Baltzly 2014 on elements of Plato’s au-
thority. These contributions set out the views on philosophical authority on the basis of which 
Olympiodorus’ position can be considered.
7 Griffin (2015: 45–46) mentions the roles of Alcibiades and Plato to be those of the beginner 
student and the perfect philosopher, respectively.
8 Olympiodorus refers to both Proclus and Damascius as his sources (Olymp. in Alc. 5, 16–6, 1). 
Proclus’ commentary is dated to AD 440–480 (Tarrant and Renaud 2015: 178). Based on historical 
references, Olympiodorus’ commentary is dated to around AD 560 (Opsomer 2010: 698). Thus, 
there is a gap of almost 1,000 years between Olympiodorus’ commentary and Plato’s dialogue, the 
latter being dated to 433–432 BC (Tarrant and Renaud 2015: 19).
9 For a discussion of Socrates’ justification as a common pattern in later Platonism, see Ro-
skam 2012: 86–87.
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ALCIBIADES AS SOCRATES’ PUPIL
Although Plato does not mention Alcibiades’ later failures in his dialogue, 
the contradiction between the details of Alcibiades’ political career and his 
representation as Socrates’ interlocutor was recognised by Plato’s contemporaries. 
According to Xenophon, for example, it was not Socrates who chose Alcibiades; 
rather, Alcibiades wanted to benefit from Socrates’ power of argumentation 
(X. Mem. I 2, 12–16). This implies, however, that Socrates was unaware of the 
fact that the young man had no interest in philosophy. Xenophon also suggests 
that Alcibiades may have been prudent when he was with the philosopher and 
that his errors may have only begun after he left him.10 That Socrates could not 
be blamed for Alcibiades’ faults was an established interpretation among the 
Platonists such as Plutarch.11
The philosophers of late antiquity approached this issue from a different 
perspective. First, they emphasised Socrates’ statement at the beginning of the 
dialogue that he was drawn to Alcibiades by a “guiding spirit” (δαιμόνιον, Pl. 
Alc. 1 103 a). Xenophon’s interpretation that Socrates was an object of ambition 
for Alcibiades was therefore judged inappropriate. Instead, it was Socrates who 
deliberately chose to talk to Alcibiades. Further, the fact that Alcibiades was to 
later cause much trouble for Athenians implied that Socratic philosophy could 
not achieve its aim and that the ‘guiding spirit’ had led Socrates into a pointless 
conversation.
Like other Platonists of late antiquity, Olympiodorus addresses this 
discrepancy by referring to some historical accounts of Alcibiades. He suggests 
that one should investigate (ζητητέον) why the guiding spirit did not prevent 
Socrates from approaching Alcibiades despite the latter making many mistakes: 
Alcibiades deserted the Athenians for Sparta, caused the Peloponnesian War by 
urging Pericles to issue a decree against Megarians and – worst of all – initiated 
a parody of the Mysteries in the house of Polytion (Olymp. in Alc. 26, 22–27, 3).
Possible sources for this account of Alcibiades’ life are Plutarch and 
Thucydides.12 Proclus too raises the issue of Alcibiades’ career in his commentary, 
10 X. Mem. I 2, 18. This suggestion was also considered by Proclus and Olympiodorus. Ho-
wever, Proclus criticised it, claiming that it was not possible that the guiding spirit did not know 
about Alcibiades’ character, since Alcibiades was inferior to the spirit (Procl. in Alc. 86–88). 
A further explanation by Xenophon is also in Olympiodorus’ view rhetorical, namely that Alci-
biades would have been an even worse person if he had not spent time with Socrates (Olymp. in 
Alc. 27, 10–15).
11 Plutarch argued, for example, that Socrates actually knew that the Sicilian Expedition would 
not be successful, but Alcibiades urged Athenians to war, since he wanted to obtain the post of 
a commander (Plu. Alc. 17, 4).
12 Plutarch was likely also Proclus’ source (Roskam 2012: 90–96). Furthermore, Proclus re-
ferred directly to Thucydides in his commentary (Procl. in Alc. 115, 1–2). The name of Polytion 
in the context of mystery cults is absent from both Plutarch’s and Thucydides’ accounts, although 
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noting that history was full of great misfortunes caused by him (Procl. in Alc. 85, 
17–86, 7). The references to historical reports on Alcibiades in the commentaries 
of Proclus and Olympiodorus show that they did not ignore his political actions. 
Nonetheless, their solution to the contradiction of Alcibiades’ life with his 
representation in Plato’s dialogue does not derive from historical sources.
Regarding Alcibiades’ political career, neither Proclus nor Olympiodorus 
accepts that Socrates achieved nothing through his dialogue with Alcibiades. 
They prefer to downplay the significance of what really happened and focus 
instead on the metaphysical aspects of the dialogue. Based on Iamblichus’ 
interpretation, Proclus maintains that the reason for the spirit’s consent to this 
conversation was to benefit Alcibiades’ soul; the effects of the dialogue may not 
be observed in Alcibiades’ present life, but rather the exchange would help him 
in another life (Procl. in Alc. 90, 1–9).13 Olympiodorus elaborates on Proclus’ 
argument, asserting that Alcibiades’ soul benefitted from his dialogue with 
Socrates and justifying the view that their interaction was not completely in vain 
(Olymp. in Alc. 27, 10–12).
Emphasising the good character traits of Alcibiades, Olympiodorus further 
supports this interpretation. According to both Proclus and Olympiodorus, 
Alcibiades was an appropriate pupil for Socrates. First, his contempt for all his 
other lovers14 posed an interesting challenge for the philosopher. Furthermore, the 
four reasons for Alcibiades’ pride – his beauty, his noble birth, his friends and his 
guardian, Pericles (Olymp. in Alc. 28, 15–20) – were not enough for the young 
man, as he appeared to attach no value to either lovers or possessions (Olymp. in 
Alc. 38, 12–18) and was not satisfied with what he had. He also wondered about 
Socrates’ approach, which indicated his inclination towards philosophy, since 
wonder is the beginning of philosophical thinking. Proclus and Olympiodorus 
thus argue similarly in favour of Alcibiades’ philosophical aptitude (ἐπιτηδειότης, 
Procl. in Alc. 39; Olymp. in Alc. 28, 15–16). However, their interpretations of 
Socrates’ response are slightly different. Whereas Olympiodorus concludes that 
Alcibiades’ behaviour such as contempt for money caused Socrates’ love for 
him, Proclus regards these character traits as the grounds for Socrates’ decision 
to be Alcibiades’ magistrate, arbiter, and judge (ἄρχοντα…κριτὴν καὶ δικαστήν, 
Procl. in Alc. 59, 11–12). This distinction is also expressed in their interpretation 
of Socrates’ philosophical practice.
it is present in Proclus’ account (Procl. in Alc. 86, 2). By contrast, Olympiodorus suggests rather 
that the parody of the mystery cults was caused by Alcibiades (αἰτίαν ἔσχεν). His phrasing is am-
biguous, as he neither directly accuses Alcibiades nor presents the case as a political conspiracy, 
as several authors do.
13 This position goes back to Iamblichus, to whom Proclus refers. For an explanation of the 
Iamblichean core in this passage and its transmission by Proclus, see the commentary by Dillon 
1973: 233–34.
14 Pl. Alc. 1 104 a 1; Procl. in Alc. 98; Olymp. in Alc. 28, 15.
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THE SOCRATIC METHOD
In Olympiodorus’ view, Socrates appears to be more a midwife than an 
instructor who pours knowledge into the minds of youth as into lifeless vessels 
(Olymp. in Alc. 12, 10–14).15 Socrates preferred to conduct investigations in his 
role as the lover–educator, by removing the distance between the teacher and the 
pupil. The philosopher helped Alcibiades (Olymp. in Alc. 4, 5–6) using mutual 
examination (κοινῇ βουλῇ) as his method (Olymp. in Alc. 24, 11–20). To this 
end, Socrates pretended to be ignorant since it was fitting for a lover to do so in 
order to lead his beloved to knowledge (Olymp. in Alc. 175, 7–10). His feigned 
ignorance was in accordance with his role as a lover (ἐρωτικός), whereas he was 
in fact a “knowledgeable person” (ἐπιστήμων) as a teacher (διδάσκαλος, Olymp. 
in Alc. 88, 4–10).
Moreover, Socrates indicated that both he and Alcibiades lacked self-
knowledge, which Olympiodorus considers to be true because self-knowledge is 
attained to different degrees. Socrates knew himself to a degree that Alcibiades 
did not match. However, at a higher level (that is, ‘as an inspired person’), his 
knowledge was deficient (Olymp. in Alc. 172, 1–2).16 Thus, it was possible that 
the philosopher too benefitted from his dialogue with Alcibiades and advanced his 
knowledge. This is demonstrated by his assertion that he too would reach a better 
state through their investigation (Olymp. in Alc. 192, 7–8). Emphasising that 
Socrates sometimes taught and at other times pondered (Olymp. in Alc. 74, 13), 
Olympiodorus concludes that the Socratic method is more fruitful than teaching 
(πλουσιωτέρα τῆς διδασκαλίας ἡ μαιεία, Olymp. in Alc. 75, 3–4). Consequently, 
he claims that the Socratic method should be applied in philosophical education, 
that is, Socratic philosophy should be learnt in the Socratic way (δεῖ Σωκρατικῶς 
τὰ Σωκράτους μανθάνειν, Olymp. in Alc. 11, 1–2).
Proclus’ view of Socrates clearly differs in this respect. In his interpretation, 
Socrates had explicitly superior knowledge, and his ignorance was only 
methodical.17 Socrates aimed to help and elevate the young Alcibiades to his 
own level.18 Therefore, Proclus regards Socrates’ love for Alcibiades as the 
15 Plato argued using this metaphor that wisdom could not be transmitted from one person to 
another (Pl. Smp. 175 d–e).
16 Olympiodorus describes the inspired person (ἐνθουσιαστικός) as one knowing oneself to be 
united with one’s proper god and acting out of inspiration. Socrates in the Alcibiades can therefore 
be regarded as undergoing a transition from theological self-knowledge (knowing oneself accor-
ding to the paradigmatic form) to inspired self-knowledge.
17 Proclus interprets Socrates’ expression “I think” (Pl. Alc. 1 103 a) as a methodical device 
(Procl. in Alc. 23) since he has some knowledge but pretends to be ignorant. Olympiodorus provi-
des the same view on this point (Olymp. in Alc. 24, 10–20).
18 Procl. in Alc. 152, 11–12. In Proclus’ description, Socrates “lifts the young man up” (Procl. 
in Alc. 60–61) or “descends like Hercules to lead his beloved from Hades” (Procl. in Alc. 133–34).
102 C A G L A U M S U-S E I F E RT
providential love of a superior being for an inferior one.19 He identifies Socrates’ 
aim as attaching Alcibiades to himself, in order that the latter may become 
a lover of knowledge (Procl. in Alc. 157). Further, Proclus mentions Socrates’ 
admiration for the beautiful and that Socrates approached Alcibiades because 
of his beauty (Procl. in Alc. 92). However, in this approach, Socrates behaved 
rather like a guiding spirit (δαίμων) to Alcibiades who should help the young 
man reach knowledge (Procl. in Alc. 40, 11–42, 4). Proclus does not indicate 
that the philosopher benefitted from the dialogue with Alcibiades. He suggests 
that Socrates acted “in a loving manner” (Procl. in Alc. 28), although clearly 
identifying Socrates and Alcibiades as the educator and the educated, respectively 
(παιδεύων and παιδευόμενος, Procl. in Alc. 151, 16–152, 1). In addition, he 
underlines the ontological difference between them (Procl. in Alc. 145–146) 
and refers explicitly to Socrates’ superior position regarding his knowledge 
(Procl. in Alc. 160). There is no indication in Proclus’ commentary that Socrates’ 
knowledge might be deficient.
The contradiction between Olympiodorus’ and Proclus’ characterisations of 
Socrates is based on the status of his knowledge and his identity as a ‘teacher’. 
Olympiodorus questions Socrates’ position as a teacher by considering his lack 
of knowledge. He regards Socrates’ critical approach to even his own opinions 
as the most important feature of his philosophical investigation. Pointing to 
Socrates’ claim that he was not teaching anything (ὁ λέγων ἀεὶ μηδὲν εἰδέναι, 
μηδένα διδάσκειν, Olymp. in Alc. 53, 1–2), Olympiodorus suggests that the 
philosopher rather aimed to make Alcibiades his own teacher (ὥστε αὐτὸν 
ἑαυτοῦ διδάσκαλον εἶναι, Olymp. in Alc. 12, 6–7).
In the case that disciples must discover their knowledge themselves, the 
teacher’s authority might be challenged. Olympiodorus confirms Socrates’ power 
(δύναμις), which is the real power that only he can give (περιποιεῖν, Olymp. in 
Alc. 55, 15–17). However, he identifies this power as knowledge (ἐπιστήμη) in 
the sense of a method of examination and proof (ἀπόδειξις, Olymp. in Alc. 55, 
19) which would make Alcibiades self-sufficient. Paradoxically, The disciple 
would ironically become free by admitting the providence of the Socratic method 
and the authority of knowledge.
Olympiodorus therefore elucidates that the source of authority was not 
Socrates, the person, but his method for reaching knowledge. In contrast to 
Proclus, he does not insist on Socrates’ role as a teacher. His presentation of the 
Socratic method focusses strongly on undertaking an interactive philosophical 
investigation and adopting a critical approach. Thus, the authority of the 
19 This providence manifests for its own sake and without any interest from the lover in per-
fecting the beloved, which means that the lover does not need the beloved. Proclus attributes to 
Socrates such providence for Alcibiades (Procl. in Alc. 54) and portrays the two as superior and 
inferior, respectively (Procl. in Alc. 56). For a detailed examination of this view, see Vasilakis 
2020: 123–150.
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teacher is not undermined since the emphasis on critical inquiry strengthens 
the influence of the philosopher. This line of thought can be elaborated through 
another teacher figure – Plato himself.
PLATO AS A TEACHER
At the beginning of his Commentary on the Alcibiades, Olympiodorus 
outlines some details of Plato’s life. After reviewing Plato’s travels, he describes 
the establishment of the Academy thus (Olymp. in Alc. 2, 145–155):
When he reached Athens he established a school in the Garden of Academus, marking off 
a certain portion of this gymnasium as a sanctuary for the Muses. And the misanthrope Ti-
mon would keep company only with Plato there. And Plato attracted very many to learning, 
both men and women, preparing [the latter] to attend his lectures looking like men (andreiôi 
skhêmati), and demonstrating that his love of wisdom was superior to any love of work. For 
he dissociated himself from Socratic irony, from frequenting the Agora and the workshops and 
from pursuing the young to engage them in conversation: and he also dissociated himself from 
the solemn dignity of the Pythagoreans – keeping the doors closed, and ‘Himself said so’ – by 
conducting himself more sociably towards everyone.
(transl. by Griffin)
This account shows that Plato’s teaching was peculiar in some respects. 
First, Olympiodorus suggests that Plato ‘attracted’ many to learning instead of 
‘pursuing’ them for conversations. Second, among these people were both women 
and men, and even a misanthrope: the school, unlike that of the Pythagoreans, 
was open to everyone. The most surprising of Olympiodorus’ remarks is, 
however, that Plato acted against the ‘love of work’ by distancing himself from 
Socratic irony: he did not prefer to spend time in the agora – instead, people 
came to his school.
At first glance, this comment appears to show a contrast between Socratic and 
Platonic teaching. However, Olympiodorus refers not to Socrates’ methodical 
ignorance but to the fact that he had conversations with young people. Plato fell 
between the Pythagoreans and Socrates, neither keeping his doors closed nor 
seeking dialogue. This distinction is also supported by Socrates’ rather personal 
relation with Alcibiades, while Plato preferred to be a teacher for all. Plato 
proved to be paradoxically sociable by staying away from public life, whereas 
Socrates was despised for disturbing people with his questions.
Olympiodorus’ interpretation of Platonic teaching serves several purposes. 
That Plato attracted students from all classes and social backgrounds paints 
an ideal picture of the Platonic school. While disapproving the Pythagoreans 
for invariably acknowledging the teacher’s authority, Olympiodorus describes 
Platonic education as a model for critical thinking. Since Platonic philosophy 
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fostered a culture of discussion, bringing people with different views together 
did not constitute a problem.
According to Olympiodorus, Socrates’ conversations did not determine 
Plato’s philosophy, since the source of philosophical authority was not the 
philosopher as a person. Plato himself did not conduct dialogues but rather 
preferred to teach the method of philosophical enquiry. In this way, he evolved 
from practising Socratic irony himself to understanding and explaining his 
method to his students. Of course, there are also “Platonic doctrines” (δόγματα) 
– rules and facts demonstrated through proper argumentation.20 However, 
Olympiodorus repeatedly states that the dogmatic authority of a master did not 
coincide with Platonic philosophy, which he describes as welcoming different 
views.21 Rather, the status of a philosopher was grounded on the method of 
investigation promoted by Platonic education.
OLYMPIODORUS’ UNDOGMATIC TEACHING
Olympiodorus expresses his own view of education through the figures of 
Alcibiades, Socrates, and Plato. He portrays Alcibiades as a student pursuing 
a political career who also approached philosophy. The description of Plato’s 
teaching as attracting many people and being open to everyone aims at this 
kind of student. Furthermore, Olympiodorus demonstrates the necessity of 
a philosophical education for a higher position in the state. The method of 
philosophy is represented by the figure of Socrates, strategically shifting the 
authority from the philosopher’s person to the philosophical investigation. 
Finally, Plato appears as the ideal teacher of the Platonic school who supports 
critical thought and discussion.
In his interpretation of the Alcibiades, Olympiodorus attempts to find 
an explanation for the relationship between the protagonists of the dialogue. 
He identifies love with the Socratic method of philosophical inquiry, as 
Socrates eradicated any hierarchical distance between the teacher and the 
pupil, rather considering the two as mutual investigators. While admitting that 
Socrates’ pretence of ignorance was a methodical strategy, Olympiodorus also 
acknowledges that Socrates’ knowledge might have been deficient. In this regard, 
20 As an example, he presents the thesis that the responder is the person who makes the state-
ments in the conversation (Olymp. in Alc. 12, 7–8). This is a conclusion from the structure of the 
dialogue. The phrase “Platonic doctrine” (Πλατωνικὸν δόγμα) is also used in the proposition that 
no conclusion is possible from false premises (89, 19–20). Likewise, in this case the ‘doctrine’ 
consists of the method of investigation.
21 As Tarrant (2000: 57–58) points out, Olympiodorus denounced Socrates and Plato as au-
thorities on any subject without the proof of a demonstrative argument (Olymp. in Gorg. 41, 9).
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his view differs from that of Proclus, who identifies Socrates as the educator and 
emphasises his knowledge.
Olympiodorus’ notion of philosophical teaching shows that he develops 
a distinct view on Platonic philosophy. While he constructs the Socratic method 
as a paradigm for his own concept of philosophical practice, the ideal teacher 
is modelled on the figure of Plato. Olympiodorus’ portrayal of Socrates and 
Plato as educators at first seems contradictory. However, the two had at least 
a couple of things in common. They possessed neither absolute knowledge nor 
unquestioned authority but supported critical questioning and argumentation. 
Both philosophers engaged with the opinions of different people, such as 
Alcibiades or the misanthrope Timon. Olympiodorus was aware that authority 
did not necessarily emerge from a doctrine itself but from its representation 
as proven by philosophical examination. Accordingly, he presents the Platonic 
philosophy as undogmatic and even critical of Plato and Socrates themselves.
In the context of late ancient Alexandria, an undogmatic philosophical 
education might have answered a need: Olympiodorus’ approach renders 
philosophy an academic discipline released from any strict doctrine, even with 
respect to Plato. The Platonic philosophy gains greater influence precisely 
because it is described as undogmatic. Through his interpretation of the Socratic 
method, Olympiodorus reduces the emphasis on the authority of the philosopher 
as a teacher and suggests that a proper discussion requires an independent analysis 
of arguments. His views on doctrinal authorities demonstrate that in his own 
educational concept he aimed to convey a less determinative and more ‘tolerant’ 
image of Platonic philosophy. Moreover, people pursuing a political career can 
easily identify his portrayal of Alcibiades as a student with themselves. This 
representation of Platonism implies that a philosophical education is the key to 
success in the state, thus reinforcing the status of Olympiodorus’ teaching. 
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OLYMPIODORUS ON PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION:  
AN UNDOGMATIC APPROACH?
S u m m a r y
The later Platonists saw a contrast between Platonic philosophy and Socrates’ dialogue with 
a much-disputed politician such as Alcibiades. This paper explores the views of Olympiodorus, 
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a 6th-century AD Platonist, on this incongruity and outlines his arguments concerning philosophical 
education. In addition, new insights will be gained in the scholarly debate on whether Olympiodorus 
can be considered a philosopher with a distinct approach. Assuming a connection between a certain 
philosophical approach and the philosopher’s view of doctrinal authorities, Olympiodorus’ portrayal 
of Socrates and Plato has been analysed. This analysis demonstrates that Olympiodorus’ main 
arguments regarding Socratic method are slightly different than those of Proclus. By presenting 
Platonic education as undogmatic, Olympiodorus asserts his own authority as a philosopher and 
teacher. His philosophical contribution therefore derives precisely from his teaching concept.
